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Developments: Recent Developments

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
REVOCATION OF PROBATION WITHOUT PRELIMINARY HEARING

In Re Meidingr
In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the United States Supreme Court extended certain due process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment to proceedings for the revocation of parole. Observing that the
"liberty" of a parolee, "although indeterminate, includes many of the core
values of unqualified liberty", the Court held that the state interest in its
revocation does not justify such state action without some informal procedural guarantees.
In the Court's opinion, the decision to revoke parole involves two
distinguishable questions: first, did the parolee violate the conditions of his
parole; and second, does such violation require revocation of the parole?
In order to guarantee that the parolee receives due process in decisions
on both issues, a two-step revocation mode was established in Morrissey.
The first step requires an initial investigation, or "preliminary hearing",
to be conducted "by some person other than the one initially dealing with
the case" (the Court suggested that another parole officer would be sufficiently uninvolved) for the purpose of evaluating the facts indicating that
a violation has occurred. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485. The parolee must
receive notice stating that this preliminary hearing is to take place, its
purpose and the alleged violations. He may appear at the hearing and
present evidence. The investigating officer should report the evidence
which he relies upon in determining that probable cause for revocation
exists.
The second step is the revocation hearing at which all contested facts
are resolved, and it is decided whether or not revocation of parole is required. The minimum requirements of due process for this second stage are
outlined by the Court at 489:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the
parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and
to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral and
detached" hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of
which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement
by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking
parole.
Eleven months after Morrissey, the United States Supreme Court
decided, in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973), that parole and
probation are constitutionally indistinguishable, and held that "a probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a preliminary hearing and a final
revocation hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer."
The Supreme Court of Montana reviewed Morrissey and Gagnon in
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In Re Meidinger, - Mont. -, 539 P.2d 1185, 32 St. Rep. 914 (1975),
which arose on a petition challenging state probation revocation procedure.
In this case, numerous violations of the conditions of the petitioner's probation had been alleged in a violation report submitted by his probation
officer. The county attorney filed a petition for imposition of final judgment with the original sentencing judge. Hearings for the determination
of the matter were set and continued on two occasions upon request of
counsel for the petitioner. The hearing took place on June 4, and on June
20 the district court ordered revocation of probation for specified reasons.
In deciding the petitions, the Montana supreme court held that the
state need not afford the probationer a preliminary hearing, distinguishing
Morrissey and Gagnon on their facts. In Re Meidinger, 539 P.2d at 1189:
Both Morrissey. . . and Gagnon. . . involved decisions of administrative
boards such as Montana's Board of Pardons. The instant case however,
involves a probation which was revoked by the original sentencing judge
as authorized by section 95-2206, R.C.M. 1947. That distinction in itself
provides an inherent sort of fairness which is not achieved through a solely
administrative process.
The court also pointed out that Meidinger was not incarcerated until after
the final decision revoking his parole had been made, as had been the
petitioners in Morrissey and Gagnon, and said, at 1190:
In that perspective it is apparent that the requirement of a preliminary
hearing was necessary in Morrissey and Gagnon to insure that some neutral body could hear the evidence and protect the rights of the accused. . . . Where no detention is involved, no such purpose can be
served.
The Montana court relied also upon the indication of the United
States Supreme Court in Morrissey that the procedure applied there was
not to be enforced without regard to the facts of the particular case. As
support for his reliance on this dicta, Chief Justice Harrison cited Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). In Wolff, the Court dealt with revocation of "good time" as a disciplinary measure in a maximum security
prison and held that less formal processes than those required in Morrissey
and Gagnon were due the inmate. In doing so, however, the Court pointed
out that the revocation of good time "does not then and there work any
change in the condition of the prisoner's 'liberty' ", and noted that such
state action is "qualitatively and quantitatively different from the revocation of parole or probation." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 560.
After disposing of the United States constitutional issue in Meidinger
in this manner, the Montana court turned to state requirements finding
that the Montana constitution requires only fundamental fairness, which
had been demonstrated; and that the petitioner had wholly failed to show
any abuse of discretion on the part of the revoking judge.
The logic of the Montana court in Meidinger is elusive. The distinction
relied on by the court between revocations before judicial, rather than
administrative, officers relates exclusively to the second step in the
Morrissey procedure, that of final revocation, and yet it is employed to
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol37/iss1/18
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escape the required first step, preliminary hearing. In addition, the fact
that Meidinger was not incarcerated until after the revocation hearing
appears to emphasize, rather than alter, the basic fact that this state
proceeding involved the question of whether or not the probationer was to
be deprived of his liberty on the basis of new wrongdoing. Precisely such
proceedings were addressed in Gagnon, where a preliminary hearing was
required. Finally, in its reliance on Wolff the Montana court fails to distinguish between the entirely different factual situation presented there and
the minor factual variations of Meidinger.
Although Mr. Chief Justice Burger states in Morrissey that the procedure it prescribes is not intended to be applied without regard to the facts
of the case, it is questionable that the latitude taken by the Montana court
was intended, particularly in view of Gagnon and Wolff. Nonetheless, In
Re Meidinger establishes that the Montana constitution does not require
that a probationer, who is not incarcerated during pendency of probation
revocation proceedings, receive a preliminary hearing, when the final revocation hearing is before the original sentencing judge.
L. Randall Bishop

ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY

McGuire v. Nelson
The courts of this country have begun to take a more liberal view
toward the admissibility of expert opinion testimony in products liability
cases. The Supreme Court of Montana, in McGuire v. Nelson, - Mont.
__,
536 P.2d 768, 32 St. Rep. 600 (1975), has allowed Montana to keep
pace with this approach.
McGuire involved an action to recover damages for injuries sustained
in a motorcycle accident. While the plaintiff was driving the motorcycle
down an incline with his wife as a passenger, the front wheel of the motorcycle locked and the plaintiff was thrown over the handlebars and onto the
ground. He received a broken pelvis; his wife was not injured.
McGuire originally brought a negligence action against the dealer for
selling the wrong size of tire to his wife. McGuire contended that the tire
sold, which was larger than that called for in the motocycle's specifications, was forced up against the fender and caused the Honda to stop
abruptly. The jury awarded McGuire $45,000 but the supreme court, in the
subsequent appeal, ordered a new trial. In so ordering, the court held
inadmissable an in-court demonstration by McGuire's expert witness. In
the demonstration, the expert had used furniture clamps to demonstrate
the force applied to the front suspension. The court could not find a proper
foundation to show that the force applied to the suspension by the clamps
was similar to the force applied to the suspension by the two riders under
the conditions present at the time of the accident.
Prior to the new trial the American Honda Company (Honda) was
added as a defendant under the theory that Honda was strictly liable for
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1976
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marketing a product which was negligently designed, and for failing to
warn against the consequences of misuse of that product.
In the new trial, the plaintiff was not allowed to elicit the opinion of
his expert concerning the design of the suspension system, the alleged
defect, and the cause of the accident. Although the qualifications of the
expert were not questioned, the trial court understood the supreme court's
decision on the first appeal to mean that the evidence upon which an
expert opinion was based had to be related to the place of the accident and
to what actually occurred there. In his investigation, the expert in the
McGuire case had used furniture clamps to take measurements to establish the point at which the suspension system was fully depressed. He had
also examined the machine itself, schematic drawings of the suspension
system, and the terrain of the accident. The expert had not conducted
dynamic tests under field conditions.
The supreme court began by distinguishing between the present appeal and the case previously remanded. The first case was an exclusion of
an in court demonstration because there was no foundation. It was also a
negligence action against a dealer whereas the present case was a strict
liability suit against a manufacturer. The court pointed out that there have
been no prohibitions declared against static tests if an expert can use the
processes in an investigation to establish causation and/or design problems, and noted the specific authorization of opinion testimony on a question of science, art or trade in which the witness is skilled given by § 93401-27, R.C.M. 1947. Writing for the majority, Justice Daly rejected the
argument that such opinion testimony invades the province of the jury; the
jury remained free to reject the expert's opinion and rely solely on their
own impressions of the evidence presented during the trial.
The court felt that the true test of admissibility in such cases is
whether the subject is sufficiently complex so as to be susceptible to opinion evidence, and whether the witness is properly qualified to give his
opinion. Finding that the knowledge of motorcycle suspension systems was
not a matter of common knowledge, but a question of mechanical engineering, and that the expert was well qualified, the court again reversed and
remanded for a new trial.
The place of the opinion of a qualified expert in a strict liability case
involving a complex subject seems to be secure in Montana.
Brad Luck

CONSTRUCTION OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN DEEDS

Higdem v. Whitham
In Higdem v. Whitham, Mont. -,
536 P.2d 1185, 32 St. Rep.
619 (1975), the Supreme Court of Montana reiterated an established guideline for the interpretation of words in deed covenants and stated a new rule
for Montana: restrictive covenants in deeds are to be strictly construed,
resolving ambiguities in favor of the free use of property.
The case involved a lot in a residential subdivision, the deed to which
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol37/iss1/18
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contained restrictive covenants providing, inter alia, that the purchasers
were not to erect any building other than a single detached dwelling house,
with or without garage, or other "like and necessary outbuilding" on the
lot; and that the purchasers were not to use any building erected on the
lot for any purpose other than those incident to the use of a private dwelling house. The expressly stated intention of the latter provision was to
prohibit the use of any structure for commercial purposes or keeping of
livestock or poultry.
The defendant constructed a large, three-stall garage on his lot and
plaintiff, his neighbor, brought suit in the Eleventh District Court, Lincoln
County, demanding that the structure be removed. The plaintiff testified
at the trial that the defendant had mentioned on two separate occasions
that he might do odd jobs as a mechanic in his garage. The defendant
testified that his existing one-stall garage had become inadequate for his
storage needs, and that storage needs were his only motivation for erecting
the new structure. The trial court concluded that the new garage, its size
and the purpose intended, were in violation of the covenants and that the
garage was not a "necessary outbuilding" and should be removed.
In reversing the trial court's decision, a Montana statute pertaining
to contract construction and cases from other jurisdictions were used by
the supreme court to establish the meaning of the words "necessary outbuilding" in the covenant. The court referred to Timmerman v. Gabriel,
155 Mont. 294, 470 P.2d 528 (1970), in which the construction of deeds had
been likened to the construction of contracts. To construe the words in
Timmerman, the court had utilized § 13-710, R.C.M. 1947. The statute
provides that the words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary
and popular sense, unless a legal or technical sense is intended by the
parties. Montana had no prior case defining the term "necessary outbuildings", so the court looked to other jurisdictions for a judicial determination
of what the word "necessary" ordinarily means in restrictive covenants.
The court expressly adopted the holding in (among other cases) Granger
v. Boulls, 21 Wash.2d 597, 152 P.2d 325 (1944), that the word "necessary"
means "convenient to the dwelling". It had been amply shown at the trial,
according to the court, that the defendant's new garage was convenient to
his dwelling.
The Montana court also found the rules of statutory construction, as
expressed in Dunphy v. Anaconda Co., 151 Mont. 76, 438 P.2d 660 (1968)
applicable to covenants. The Dunphy case held, at 438 P.2d 662, that
"where the language of a statute is plain, unambiguous, direct and certain,
the statute speaks for itself and there is nothing left for the court to construe". The language of the covenants in this case being, the court said,
plain, unambiguous, direct and certain, must be left to speak for themselves. No limitations should be inserted by the court.
The concluding statements of the opinion express a guide for future
construction of restrictive deed covenants. Among these concluding remarks, at 536 P.2d 1189, the court says:
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[Tihe overriding policy of individual expression in free and reasonable
land use dictates that restrictions should not be aided or extended by
implication or enlarged by construction.
Mark D. Safty

NECESSITY IN EMINENT DOMAIN: AMOUNT AND EXTENT

Silver Bow County v. Ha/er
The Supreme Court of Montana, in Silver Bow County v. Hafer,
Mont.

-,

532 P.2d 691, 32 St. Rep. 243 (1975), expressly adopted the

rule that "a condemning authority cannot acquire a greater interest or
estate in the condemned property than the public use requires." Hafer, 532
P.2d at 692.
Carl and Patricia Hafer appealed from the order of necessity allowing
Silver Bow County to condemn in fee 3.64 acres of their property located
at the end of the Silver Bow County Airport runway. The property was
allegedly needed to establish a "clear zone" in accordance with Federal
Aviation Administration (F.A.A.) regulations. On appeal, the Hafers
maintained that the county had failed to demonstrate a necessity for taking in fee.
Before property in Montana can be taken pursuant to the state's right
of eminent domain, it must appear that the taking is necessary to a use
authorized by law. § 93-9905, R.C.M. 1947. The F.A.A. regulation in question, of which the trial court took judicial notice, distinctly required the
establishment of "clear zones" at the ends of runways whenever feasible.
14 C.F.R. § 151.9(a) (1975). The regulation specifically stated, however,
that an easement was a sufficient estate if it provided "enough control to
rid the clear zone of all obstructions . . . and to prevent the creation of

future obstructions; together with the right of entrance and exit for those
purposes. . .

."

14 C.F.R. §51.9(c) (1975).

The court in Ha/er, 532 P.2d at 692, adopted without discussion the
following rule:
It is well established that a condemning authority cannot acquire a greater
interest or estate in the condemned property than the public use requires.
The court cited 3 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 9.2(2) (1965), and several
decisions from other states in support of this rule.
The application of this rule to the facts of the Ha/er case clearly
warranted a reversal of the order commanding a taking in fee, since the
regulation expressly stated that a fee was not necessary. Nonetheless, the
court proceeded to apply the balancing test of State v. Whitcomb, 94
Mont. 415, 22 P.2d 823, 826 (1933), which is used to determine the necessity requisite to any condemnation under R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9905. The test
requires a balancing of the good resulting from a public taking and use
against the injury suffered by the private citizen whose property is taken.
The application of the Whitcomb test, although unnecessary, mandated
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol37/iss1/18
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the proper result, namely, a holding that the county failed to demonstrate
the necessity for taking the Hafers' property in fee.
The adoption of the Hafer rule thus requires those seeking condemnation to establish not only the necessity of taking the amount of property
sought, but the necessity of taking the extent of the estate sought in such
property as well. The Montana supreme court has found the Whitcomb
test applicable in determining both types of necessity.
E. Craig Daue

CULTIVATION OF MARIJUANA DEFINED

As

SALE

State ex rel. LeMieux v. District Court
In State ex rel. LeMieux v. District Court of the Fifth Judicial
District, - Mont. -, 531 P.2d 665, 32 St. Rep. 83 (1975), the Supreme
Court of Montana ruled on the constitutionality of § 54-132, R.C.M. 1947.
The narrow issue of the case was whether the portion of that statute which
includes the cultivation of dangerous drugs within the definition of "sale"
offended the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
supreme court, in a 3-2 decision, held that it did not, emphasizing the
power of the legislature to broadly define punishable offenses.
In LeMieux, the two defendants were charged with criminal sale of
marijuana. The state's evidence showed that the defendants were engaged
in the cultivation of some 30 marijuana plants, but failed to show that they
had ever, under the common definition of the term, sold it. At the close of
the state's case, a motion to dismiss entered by the defendants was
granted. The district court ruled that the statute in question raised an
irrebuttable presumption that a person who grows marijuana also sells it.
The county attorney obtained a continuance, and petitioned for a writ of
supervisory control, asking that the district court's action be overruled.
The defendants' contention on appeal was that the inclusion of "cultivation" as a type of "criminal sale" raised a conclusive presumption which
was unconstitutionally arbitrary. Citing Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463
(1943), they argued that a rational basis for concluding sale of marijuana
from mere cultivation could not be found. In the supreme court's opinion,
however, the rational basis argument was never resolved. The court held
that the statute did not create a presumption at all, but merely "defined
a criminal offense in terms of several types of conduct which may constitute that single offense." LeMieux, 531 P.2d at 667. The majority felt that
enactment of such a broadly inclusive statute was well within the legislative power.
The outcome in LeMieux clearly turned on statutory construction.
The majority construed the language of the statute as a definition, while
the minority found in the same language a conclusive, and unconstitutional, presumption. The Montana statute on construction of penal statutes, § 94-1-102, R.C.M. 1947, does not adopt the common law rule of strict
construction. It only requires that such a statute be construed "according
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1976
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to the fair import of its terms, with a view to effect its object and promote
justice." Analysis of the Montana Dangerous Drug Act, Title 54, R.C.M.
1947, shows that the decision in LeMieux does little to promote the legislative philosophy of Montana drug laws.
The argument against the statute's inclusive definition is compelling.
The punishments provided by the Dangerous Drug Act are graduated in
order to deal less harshly with users of drugs than with sellers. The penalties vary from up to one year in the county jail and up to a $1,000 fine,
with mandatory deferred imposition for minors, to a possible life sentence
for criminal sale. It is clear that the distinction in severity of penalties is
based on the element of trafficking in drugs. This conclusion is further
strengthened by the passage in the 1975 session of the Montana Legislature
of a Possession with Intent to Sell statute, § 54-133.1, R.C.M. 1947, with
a penalty of up to 20 years imprisonment, compared with only 5 years for
possession with no intent to sell. In the context of a Dangerous Drug Act
with such a clearly expressed object of punishing sale more harshly than
mere possession, it is difficult to understand why the defendant who has
cultivated, but not sold, should be precluded from proving that his action
should be punished as mere possession.
The conclusion cannot be escaped that when the Montana Legislature
wanted to prohibit cultivation of marijuana, it chose an unfair and inconsistent method of doing so. The majority opinion in LeMieux suggests that
the legislature could enact a separate statute prohibiting cultivation.
Given the reluctance of the supreme court to liberally construe the existing
statue, further legislative action consistent with the punitive objectives of
the Dangerous Drug Act is clearly called for.
Christian D. Tweeten

UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT AND THE STATE'S RIGHT

To

REIMBURSEMENT FROM FUNDS COLLECTED THEREUNDER

State v. Hultgren
In light of the myriad of problems involved in collecting support and
maintenance, the 1969 Montana legislature adopted the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) § 93-2601-1 et. seq., R.C.M.
1947, in an effort to provide additional remedies for enforcement of duties
of support. Although some provisions for criminal remedies are included,
URESA is essentially a civil procedure, the source of its greatest effectiveness being in its interstate application. By definition an obligee includes
"a state or political subdivision to whom a duty of support is owed" and §
93-2601-48, R.C.M. 1947, further provides:
If a state or a political subdivision furnishes support to an individual
obligee it has the same right to initiate a proceeding under this act as the
individual obligee for the purpose of securing reimbursement for support
furnished and of obtaining continuing support.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol37/iss1/18
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Coupled with § 61-115, R.C.M. 1947, which states:
If a parent neglects to provide articles necessary for his child under his
charge, according to his circumstances, a third person may in good faith
supply such necessaries, and recover the reasonable value thereof from the
parent.
the law seems clear that public welfare agencies are entitled to reimbursement for Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) funds expended on behalf of
an individual who thereafter collects payment of support arrearages. However, the November, 1975, decision of the Supreme Court of Montana in
State v. Hultgren, - Mont. -,
541 P.2d 1211, 32 St. Rep. 1091, is to
the contrary.
The defendant and appellant, Roxanne Hultgren, applied for and received ADC payments for a lengthy period of time, stating her children
were without support. After personally initiating URESA proceedings, she
successfully recovered support arrearages of $4,900.00, which sum was held
by the court pending a determination as to whether the Department of
Social and Rehabilitation Services or Ms. Hultgren was entitled to the
money. Judgment was granted for the state agency, and Ms. Hultgren
appealed.
Although the supreme court upheld the state's contention that it possessed the right to initiate URESA proceedings or join in any such proceedings initiated by the individual obligee, it did not find that § 93-2601-48,
R.C.M. 1947, served as a basis for an action against the individual obligee:
The State did not choose to initiate a URESA proceeding or join in defendant's action, therefore, it cannot now claim the benefit of this section to
recover from defendant, having voluntarily waived the right granted
thereunder.
And, even though the court found the state "may properly be held to
be a 'person' for the purposes of § 61-115, R.C.M. 1947", there was no
showing that the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services was
attempting to recover from the neglectful parent.
The state further argued that the proceeds should be recoverable
under the doctrine of equitable subrogation. But the court, citing 83 C.J.S.
Subrogation, § 6, held that subrogation is not allowed where an adequate
remedy at law exists. Sections 93-2601-48 and 61-115, R.C.M. 1947, provide adequate legal remedies. In this instance, the first was waived when
the state failed to initiate a URESA proceeding or join in Mrs. Hultgren's
proceeding, and the second remedy is available, but the cause of action is
against the neglectful parent.
The effect of this ruling is to require the state, or a political subdivision thereunder, to join in the filing of all URESA proceedings involving
ADC recipients, if the state wishes to be reimbursed.
Sandra S. Johnson
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To ISSUE SEARCH WARRANTS

State v. Tropf and State v. Snider
During 1975 there were three significant developments defining the
authority of city and justice of the peace courts to issue search warrants.
First, the Montana supreme court in State v. Tropf, Mont.-, 32
St. Rep. 56 (1975), found police court judges had no authority to issue
search warrants. Second, a 1975 legislative amendment gave police court
judges the same jurisdiction and responsibility as justices of the peace in
handling search warrants. Third, in State v. Snider, - Mont. -, 32
St. Rep. 1056 (1975), a case arising before the 1975 amendment but decided
after its passage, the Supreme Court of Montana upheld the authority of
justices of the peace to issue search warrants in drug cases.
Tropf involved an appeal from an order of the district court, Cascade
County, suppressing crucial state's evidence supporting an information
charging possession of marijuana in excess of 60 grams. The evidence was
obtained in a search of the defendant's home and yard. On the day of the
search in question there were no district judges present in the courthouse.
A Great Falls police detective submitted a complaint and affidavit to a city
police judge, who upon hearing sworn testimony in support of the complaint and affidavit, signed the search warrant. The warrant on its face
appeared to be issued by a district court. Armed with the warrant, detectives searched Tropf's house and found numerous plastic bags containing
marijuana residue, some marijuana seeds, and drug use paraphernalia. In
a hole in the backyard approximately three pounds of marijuana were
discovered.
The district court found the search warrant was fatally defective for
the following reasons:
(1) The person signing the warrant was without lawful authority to issue
a warrant out of the district court of the Eighth Judicial District in that
he is not a district judge of that court.
(2) The affidavit and complaint on which the warrant was issued were
not retained by the judge as required by § 95-706, R.C.M. 1947.
On appeal the state argued that § 95-206, R.C.M. 1947, together with
§ 95-704, R.C.M. 1947, authorize a police judge to issue search warrants.
Section 95-704 states: "Any judge may issue a search warrant." The term
"judge" is defined in § 95-206 as:
"Judge" means a person who is invested by law with the power to perform
judicial functions and includes court, justice of the peace, or police magistrate when a particularcontext so requires. [Emphasis added].
The supreme court answered that police courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction and such courts have only that authority which is expressly
conferred upon them. Section 11-1602, R.C.M. 1947, at the time of Tropf,
defined the subject matter jurisdiction of a police court and gave no express authority to issue search warrants. The court reasoned that the term
"judge" does not require the inclusion of a police magistrate as a person
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol37/iss1/18
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authorized to issue search warrants, ruled the search warrant in this case
void, and upheld the suppression of evidence by the district court.
The 1975 legislature passed an amendment establishing city courts
and renaming police courts as city courts, § 93-411, R.C.M. 1947. Another
1975 amendment gave city court judges the same jurisdiction andresponsibility as justices of the peace in handling applications for search warrants:
...(3) Application for search warrants and complaints charging the
commission of a felony may be filed in the city or town court and when
they are so filed the city judge shall have the same jurisdiction and responsibility as a justice of the peace, including the holding of a preliminary
hearing. The city attorney may file an application for a search warrant or
a complaint charging the commission of a felony when the offense was
committed within the city limits. The county attorney, however, must
handle any action after a defendant is bound over to district court. § 111602, R.C.M. 1947.
This statute provides a city court judge with authority to issue search
warrants concurrently with justices of the peace.
The authority of justice courts to issue search warrants was challenged
in 1975. The challenge was in a case arising before the passage of the city
court legislative amendments, but decided by the Supreme Court of Montana after passage of the amendments. In State v. Snider, - Mont. __,
32 St. Rep. 1056 (1975), a search warrant issued by a justice of the peace
was challenged, upheld by the district court, and on appeal upheld by the
Montana supreme court. In this case, a Lewistown justice of the peace
issued a search warrant on the basis of a sworn application by a Fergus
County deputy sheriff. The warrant authorized any peace officer of the
state to search a certain described house in Lewistown for marijuana and
other drug substances. A search of the house produced illicit drugs and the
Fergus County Attorney brought felony charges for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.
Prior to trial, Snider moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the
house pursuant to the search warrant. Following a hearing, the district
court denied the motion to suppress and the defendant was convicted. One
of the issues on appeal was whether denial of the defendant's motion to
suppress was reversible error. Defendant contended that a justice of the
peace has no jurisdiction or authority to issue search warrants for dangerous drugs. Referring to Tropf, the supreme court reasoned that a justice of
the peace does not stand on the same footing as a police judge when it
comes to issuing search warrants. Unlike a police magistrate, they found
a justice of the peace is included within the term "any judge" in § 95-704,
R.C.M. 1947, in the context of issuing search warrants.
Basic differences were mentioned by the court in justifying its distinction between police and justice courts. Among these distinctions were: (1)
justice courts are constitutionally created while police courts are statutorily created and (2) the legislature had given justice courts the power to
act as examining courts in felony cases, while such power had not been
granted to police courts at the time this case arose.
In upholding the authority of a justice court to issue search warrants,
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1976
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the court found that the legislature intended to include the power to issue
search warrants within the grant of power to act as examining courts. They
found this from legislative history coupled with Montana's existing judicial
structure. They noted that under former § 54-112, R.C.M. 1947, justices
of the peace did not have jurisdiction to issue search warrants relating to
illegal possession of drugs. In 1969, however, the legislature passed the
present Dangerous Drugs Act which does not limit the issuance of search
warrants to district judges, or to any particular type of judge. Section 54138, R.C.M. 1947, now provides: "The district court shall have exclusive
trial jurisdiction over all prosecutions commenced under the Montana
Dangerous Drugs Act." [Emphasis added]. The court reasoned that the
use of the term "trial jurisdiction" constituted legislative acknowledgment
that other types of jurisdiction exist in these cases which are not vested
exclusively in the district courts. Further, the court reasoned that perhaps
the clearest indication of how the legislature itself treated the subject was
the 1975 amendment giving city judges the same jurisdiction and responsibility as justices of the peace in handling applications for search warrants.
The court noted that their construction was also consistent with the
United States constitutional guarantees requiring a "neutral and detached
magistrate" to examine the application for a search warrant and determine
whether a reasonable cause exists for its issuance.
In both Snider and Tropf the court also issued a warning by expressing
its disapproval of a search warrant directed to "any peace officer of this
state," and recommended that this practice be discontinued and the warrants be directed to a particular officer. In neither case, however, was this
defect itself found fatal to the validity of the search warrant.
Although Tropf denied the authority of a police court judge to issue
search warrants, this denial was on the basis of the existing statutory grant
of jurisdiction to police courts. The 1975 legislature granted city (police)
courts concurrent jurisdiction with justice courts, including power to hold
preliminary hearings in felony cases and power to issue search warrants.
The authority of justice courts to issue search warrants in drug cases was
subsequently upheld by Snider. Consequently, both city courts and justice
courts have concurrent jurisdiction, even in drug cases, to issue search
warrants.
Nicholas C. Spika

FISHING RIGHTS ON THE CROW RESERVATION

United States v. Finch
On October 13, 1973, the Crow Tribe of Indians issued a Tribal Ordinance prohibiting non-Tribal members from fishing within the exterior
boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation. On May 5, 1974, James Junior
Finch was arrested while fishing in the Big Horn River from a Montana
Fish and Game Commission access site. An information pursuant to 18
U.S.C. 1165 was filed, charging Finch with fishing in a river on Indian trust
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol37/iss1/18
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land closed to hunting and fishing by any non-Crow citizens.
On April 9, 1975, in United States v. Finch, 395 F. Supp 205, 32 St.
Rep. 364 (D. Mont. 1975), Federal Judge James Battin ruled the information insufficient on its face and ordered it dismissed. An analysis of Judge
Battin's holding reveals three specific rulings of significance.
(1) After a review of pertinent treaties and the nature of the Crow
Tribe's title, Judge Battin specifically overruled a prior order in this case
and his holding in United States v. Haug and Mill, D. Mont., Billings Div.,
Misc. Crim. No. 511 (June 9, 1971) that the Big Horn River bed is held by
the United States in trust for the Crow Tribe. Judge Battin held that
neither the Treatey of Fort Laramie of 1851 nor the Treaty with the Crow
Indians of 1868 made specific reference to the title of the Big Horn River
bed. He found that the Big Horn River, as a navigable river, ought to be
subject to the rule for disposal of the beds of navigable streams as stated
in United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926). In Holt, the
Supreme Court said that the United States regards land under navigable
waters as held for the benefit of future States and would not recognize
disposals otherwise save in exceptional instances where the intention was
made very plain. Judge Battin distinguished Choctaw Nation v.
Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970), where the Choctaw Nation was given title
to land underlying a navigable stream. In Choctaw Nation, the practical
question was one of ownership of minerals under the river bed and, in a
treaty with the U.S., the Choctaws were specifically and expressly promised that no part of the land granted to them would ever be embraced by
any territory or state. No similarly explicit grant was made to the Crow
Tribe. The judge concluded that the treaties involved in the Finch case
more closely approximate the Holt case than the Choctaw Nation case,
thus holding that the bed of the Big Horn River was not land held in trust
by the United States for the Crow Tribe.
(2) The court further held that even if the United States held the bed
of the Big Horn River in trust for the Crow Tribe, the information would
be dismissed on the ground that the defendant was standing on land belonging to the State of Montana and as an owner of land adjacent to a
navigable stream, the state has riparian rights. The plaintiff cited United
States v. Pollmann, 364 F. Supp. 995 (D. Mont. 1973) in its argument but
the court distinguished Pollmann from Finch. In Pollmann, the defendant
was fishing from a boat on a portion of Flathead Lake which is held in trust
for the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Indian Tribes. In Finch, the
defendant was fishing from property owned by the State of Montana. The
court, therefore, found no trespass upon Indian land, an essential element
for an offense under 18 U.S.C. 1165.
(3) The third significant holding in the Finch case was directed to the
question of the sovereignty of the Crow Tribe. Judge Battin held that the
Crow Tribe did not have the power to issue the October 13, 1973 ordinance
and so declared the ordinance invalid. Once again the judge looked to the
wording of the treaties and found no grant of exclusive rights to hunting
or fishing in the Crow Tribe. He recognized that if, historically, a tribe was
composed of fishermen and derived its food supply from fishing, exclusive
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fishing rights in accustomed aboriginal places might be implied from the
grant of the reservation. The conclusion was that there was insufficient
evidence in the Finch case to place the Crow Tribe in such a category. The
opinion emphasized that when treaties do not expressly create an exclusive
right to fish and when such treaties cannot reasonably be construed by
implication to create such a right, a court has no power to create that right.
United States v. Finch is currently on appeal in the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. The present holding reinforces the rights of the State of
Montana over its navigable waterways, absent clear and direct statutory
or treaty language to the contrary, and the right of the public to fish those
waterways. In so holding, the district court's opinion restricts the sovereignty of the Crow Tribe; the Crow Tribe has neither the exclusive fishing
rights over navigable waterways passing through the Crow Indian Reservation nor may the Tribe prohibit fishing from non-Indian land located
within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. It once again becomes
apparent that, as Judge Smith noted in United States v. Blackfeet Indian
Reservation, 369 F. Supp. 562 (D. Mont. 1973), ". . . an Indian Tribe is
sovereign to the extent that the United States permits it to be sovereign
-neither more nor less."
Willis B. Jones II
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